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A CALL FOR ACTION: THE BURNING ISSUE
OF SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE*
Traditionally, cigarette smoking has always been considered a personal
choice involving individual liberties.' This is no longer the case.2 There is
an increasing concern among medical experts about the dangers of involun-
tary smoking and the effect it will have on non-smokers. Involuntary smok-
ing, also known as "passive" or "second-hand" smoking, is defined as
inhaling the cigarette smoke of others. 3 Today, the number of people smok-
ing has decreased to 30% in the United States,4 while the non-smoking ma-
jority has increased its demand for its right to breathe in a smoke-free
environment.5 Due to the increasing medical evidence, the will of this ma-
jority has been expressed by the United States Congress, which recently
passed an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 prohibiting smok-
ing on all scheduled airline flights of less than two hours.6
With this amendment as the catalyst to future legislation,7 the tobacco
industry has used its lobbying efforts to prevent or delay any further anti-
smoking legislation.8 The question remains whether the will of the grass
roots majority can overcome the influential tobacco industry lobbyists. If so,
there will be a flood of legislation from national, state and local levels re-
stricting smoking in various public places.
*This paper is dedicated to Mary Doolan and Kate Salisbury, who have experienced the
hazards of involuntary and voluntary smoking.
1. Weiss & Speizer, The Surgeon General's Report on the Health Consequences of Invol-
untary Smoking: A Commentary, 135(6) AM. REV. RESPIR. Dis. 1225 (1987) [hereinafter
Weiss]. These liberties include the freedom of choice, that is, whether an individual wishes to
expose himself to the hazards of smoking.
2. Id.
3. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF IN-
VOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, PUB. No. 87-8398 (1986).
Fielding & Phenow, Health Effects of Involuntary Smoking, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1452
(1988). See also Koop, Non-Smokers: Time to Clear the Air, READER'S DIGEST, Apr. 1987, at
110.
4. Koop, supra note 3, at 110.
5. See infra note 112.
6. Federal Aviation Act, infra note 106.
7. See infra note 111.
8. See, e.g., Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (1987). This suit was
brought by a representative of the tobacco industry in an effort to defeat the administrative
rule prohibiting smoking in all public places in New York. This claim was based on the argu-
ment that authority was not properly delegated to the Public Health Council to promulgate
this rule.
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Advocates of non-smokers' rights have focused their efforts on obtaining
restrictions in the workplace.9 Non-smokers have employed two avenues in
an attempt to enforce their rights, that is, the courts and legislatures. In
tracing the successes and failures of this crusade, this Comment illustrates
that the tobacco industry's argument has failed in the judicial system,' °
while increasing medical evidence demonstrating the dangers of involuntary
smoking" has influenced the legislatures to intervene. This Comment con-
cludes that the most attentive ears lie in the legislatures to resolve this burn-
ing issue.
I. MEDICAL EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES A CALL FOR ACTION
"Ever since the first Surgeon General's report on the hazards of smoking
in 1964, it has been an established fact that cigarette smoking is a killer. In
the United States alone, it contributes to at least 160,000 deaths each year -
equivalent to a packed jumbo-jetliner crashing every twelve hours."'2 While
cigarette smoking has been considered a matter of individual choice and per-
sonal freedom,' 3 the focus has shifted recently to third parties affected by an
individual's decision to smoke. The Surgeon General's Report of 1986 ex-
trapolates from the evidence about the effects of involuntary smoking on the
health of children and adults."' The harmful constituents of mainstream
cigarette smoke are found in sidestream smoke and, at times, to a greater
extent than in mainstream smoke.' 5 Therefore, the involuntary smoker may
be subject to the same health risks as the smoker himself.
C. Everett Koop, M.D., Surgeon General of the United States, reported
that the overall evidence based on the reports of over sixty scientists verified
that the exposure to environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS") increases the
incidence of lung cancer in non-smokers. ' 6 The tobacco industry has refuted
9. Further, it has been recognized that these smoking restrictions cannot extend to the
home because the fourth amendment prohibits government intrusion in the private home.
Weiss, supra note 1.
10. See, e.g., GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979);
FENSR v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C.1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979); Kensell v. State of Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350 (10th
Cir. 1983); Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976),
aff'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
11. See generally infra notes 12-33 and accompanying text.
12. Koop, supra note 3, at 110 (emphasis in original).
13. Weiss, supra note 1.
14. Id; see also Lee & Wigle, Deaths in Canada from Lung Cancer Due to Involuntary
Smoking, 136 CAN. MED. A.J. 372 (1987) which discusses estimates that involuntary smoking
causes 330 deaths from lung cancer a year among Canadians who have never smoked.
15. Americans For Nonsmoker's Rights, Tobacco Smoke and the Nonsmoker (1985).
16. Koop, supra note 3.
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these conclusions, as well as those of other advocates of non-smokers'
rights.17 In drawing its own conclusions, the tobacco industry asserts that
the evidence relating ETS to health effects is scanty, contradictory and often
fundamentally flawed. 8 In looking at the quality of the evidence, most of
the studies have been criticized for significant flaws in methodology, such as,
"to[o] few subjects to permit statistically reliable findings, failure to provide
appropriate controls against which comparisons can be made, failure to ver-
ify the origin of the primary cancer in all subjects, and failure to account for
lifestyle factors that might influence the results."' 9  Further, the tobacco
industry suggests that the issue of involuntary smoking is a scientific
question:
Individual scientists and groups of scientists are being asked fre-
quently whether tobacco smoke in the environment presents a dan-
ger to the health of nonsmokers. The issue is not whether some
people are annoyed by the smoke of others. Nor is it whether
prohibiting smoking in the vicinity of nonsmokers might indirectly
'help' smokers by forcing them to smoke less often. It is a purely
scientific question, not a policy question.2" (Emphasis added).
Finally, the tobacco industry points to specific studies which detract from
some of the Surgeon General's primary assertions.2' The Surgeon General
acknowledges that stronger evidence may be needed to justify restrictions on
smoking, and he points to the fact that new reports are surfacing indicating
the hazards of involuntary smoking. Moreover, "what lawyers call a 'pre-
ponderance of evidence' is on the side of those who want to clear the air."2 2
17. Tobacco Institute, Tobacco Smoke and the Nonsmoker: Scientific Integrity at the
Crossroads (1987) [hereinafter Tobacco Smoke].
18. Id. at 1.
19. A. Katzenstein, Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) and Risk of Lung Cancer -How
Convincing is the Evidence? (Mar. 1987) (unpublished manuscript).
20. See Tobacco Smoke, supra note 17, at 1.
21. Id. For example, "The study, from the Pulmonary Section of Yale University's
School of Medicine, examined the response of nine young asthmatic subjects ranging in age
from 19 to 30, to intense levels of machine-generated cigarette smoke. The subjects, who were
not smokers themselves, were exposed in an environmental chamber for one hour to what the
authors termed a 'severe simulation of passive smoking, beyond what normally occurs in the
majority of social or occupational environments.' The exposure produced no wheezing and no
change in expiratory flow rates. In fact, the authors reported, it 'caused a slight decrease in
nonspecific bronchial reactivity' [emphasis in original] - that is, a slight improvement in the
abnormal tendency of an asthmatic patient to react to a standard 'bronchoprovocation' test by
a constriction of breathing passages." Id. at 2. See also H. Wiedemann, D. Mahler, J. Loke,
J. Vigulto, P. Snyder, and R. Matthay, Acute Effects of Passive Smoking on Lung Function and
Airway Reactivity in Asthmatic Subject, 89 CHEST 180 (1986) [hereinafter Wiedemann].
22. Koop, supra note 3, at 112. In lung cancer alone, the Surgeon General reviewed thir-
teen studies; eleven of which concluded a positive correlation between involuntary smoking
and lung cancer. Id. See generally Fielding, supra note 3, at 1453.
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For instance, a scientific study has suggested that 5,000 non-smokers die
each year from lung cancer traced to involuntary smoking.23 This number,
when compared to the number of deaths caused by environmental and occu-
pational agents which are already regulated by the federal government, such
as, air pollution, cotton, coal, radon and silica dusts, involuntary smoking
appears to be one of the most important causes of chronic lung injury.24
Moreover, the Surgeon General emphasizes, "the importance of involun-
tary smoking as a public health issue is not related solely to the number of
cases of cancer produced but to the societal issue of freedom from expo-
sure."25 Involuntary smoking affects everyone in either obvious or cosmetic
ways. For example, the most common effects associated with exposure to
involuntary smoke are eye, nose and throat irritations,26 as well as the dis-
comforting odor that lingers in hair, clothes and furniture due to the inabil-
ity to effectively control the ventilation of tobacco smoke." Moreover,
"respiratory symptoms, such as wheezing, coughing and sputum production
are increased about 20 to 80 percent in children of smoking parents.28 Also,
respiratory infections manifested as pneumonia and bronchitis are signifi-
cantly increased in infants of smoking parents. '29.
The most viable means available to limit the hazards of involuntary smok-
ing are to regulate smoking in the workplace and other public places.30
Studies have concluded that non-smokers who work for an extended period
of time in areas where smoking is present show as much loss of small-air-
ways lung function as light smokers.3" In a 1985 address, Surgeon General
Koop said that "a non-smoking employee who shares an office with an em-
ployee who smokes two packs of cigarettes a day, smokes three cigarettes a
day involuntarily. ' '3 2 There is also an increased concern for many non-
23. Fielding, supra note 3, at 1453.
24. Koop, supra note 3, at 112. Furthermore, a "1985 study by the American Cancer
Society showed that the lung cancer risks doubled for non-smoking women whose husbands
smoked 20 cigarettes a day at home." Id. See Korcok, US Surgeon General Ignites Furor with
Findings on Smoking in the Workplace, 134 CAN. MED. A. J. 801 (1986). See also Lee & Wigle,
supra note 14.
25. Weiss, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
26. Koop, supra note 3, at 112.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 111.
29. Id. at 111-112. See generally Fielding, supra note 3.
30. Weiss, supra note 1.
31. White & Froeb, Small-Airways Dysfunction in Nonsmokers Chronically Exposed to
Tobacco Smoke, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 720 (1980).
32. R. Carlson, Toward a Smoke Free Workplace (1986). The Second Joint Conference of
the Chemical Institute of Canada and the American Chemical Society found that in one hour
in a smoke-filled room non-smoker may inhale volatile nitrosamines (cancer-causing agents) as
much as is found in 5-30 cigarettes. Id. at 7.
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smokers who already have health problems. The presence of tobacco smoke
in the atmosphere may precipitate breathing problems or allergy attacks in
these non-smokers who form a significant part of most employee
populations.33
The evidence supports the conclusion that there is an urgent need to place
restrictions on smoking and smokers in order to protect the non-smoking
majority. Regulation of smoking in the workplace is likely to be the most
plausible means by which to afford such protection. The question remains as
to what source of authority would bring about such regulation effectively.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSE.
The three sources of legal rights available to non-smokers seeking a
smoke-free environment are: (1) the Constitution of the United States;
(2) common law; and (3) statutes. Some suits brought by non-smokers have
proven successful, and future suits are likely to succeed as more evidence of
the hazards of involuntary smoking becomes available. Nonetheless, some
claims have been rejected due to the lack of tangible medical evidence. Con-
sequently, future litigants will need the support of strong medical evidence of
the inherent dangers of involuntary smoking in order to breathe life into
such claims.
A. Constitutional Claims.
The courts have consistently rejected claims that the Constitution guaran-
tees individuals a right to a smoke-free work environment. 34 These cases
raise essentially three constitutional arguments. The landmark case employ-
ing these constitutional arguments is Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposi-
tion District, 35 in which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Louisiana Stadium
& Exposition District from continuing to allow tobacco smoking during
events in the Louisiana Superdome. 36
33. Id. "For instance, among a work force population at the Social Security Administra-
tion offices in Baltimore, 10% had heart problems, 39% reported respiratory problems and
10% declared they were allergic to tobacco smoke." Id. at 7.
34. Ashe & Vaughan, Smoking in the Workplace: A Management Perspective, 11 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 383, 384 (1986).
35. 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
36. The plaintiff brought these claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which states
in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory .... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
1989]
226 Journal of Contemporary Health Law atid Policy [Vol. 5:221
In Gasper, the plaintiffs, individually and as representatives of other non-
smokers similarly situated, claimed that the existence of tobacco smoke in
the Superdome created a chilling effect upon the exercise of their first
amendment rights "to receive others' thoughts and ideas,"3 7 since they must
breathe that harmful smoke as a precondition to enjoying events in the
Superdome.38 However, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana held that the State's allowance of smoking in the Superdome
adequately "preserves the delicate balance of individual rights without yield-
ing to the temptation to intervene in purely private affairs." '39
In addition, the plaintiffs in Gasper alternatively contended that under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution, the State of Louisiana
was unlawfully depriving non-smoking Superdome patrons of their life, lib-
erty and property without due process of law.' The plaintiffs asserted that
the penumbrae of these amendments provide the right to be free from haz-
ardous tobacco smoke while in state buildings.4" Once again, the court re-
jected this claim after balancing the due process rights of the non-smoking
plaintiffs against the rights of others attending events in the Superdome.42
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.
37. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 718.
38. Id. at 718. See also Lamont v. Postmaster General, United States, 381 U.S. 301
(1965). U.S. CONST. amend. I, which provides that:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances."
39. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 718.
40. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. V which states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1, which states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
41. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 718. See also Pollak v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450
(D.C. Cir. 1951), rev'd, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
42. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 718. See also Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,
464 (1952).
A Call For Action: The Burning Issue
The court affirmed the decision in Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp.,43 which held
that "[n]o legally enforceable right to a healthful environment, giving rise to
an action for damages, is guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment or any
other provision of the Federal Constitution." 4 The court in Gasper recog-
nized that the Constitution does not provide "judicial remedies for every
social and economic ill."'45 However, it can be inferred from the court's
decision that it acknowledged the need for a resolution to this social and
economic ill, but that a judicial remedy would create a legal avenue "hereto-
fore unavailable through which an individual could attempt to regulate the
social habits of his neighbor." 46
The plaintiffs' third constitutional assertion in Gasper was that breathing
smoke-free air is one of the non-enumerated fundamental rights protected by
the ninth amendment as recognized in Griswold v. State of Connecticut.47 In
rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the court held that unlike the right of sanctity
in the marriage relationship, the right to breathe smoke-free air in the
Superdome "does not ... rise to those constitutional proportions envisioned
in Griswold.' '48 The court also stated that to recognize a fundamental right
to a smoke-free environment would be to "mock the lofty purposes of such
amendments and broaden their penumbral protections to unheard of
boundaries." 49
Gasper is distinct from the problems posed by smoking in the workplace
because the atmosphere of the average workplace is significantly different
from that of the Louisiana Superdome for reasons such as size, capacity and
the nature of the event. Gasper is also distinct in that a non-smoker volunta-
rily chooses to attend the Superdome for purposes of enjoyment and plea-
sure, whereas attendance at the workplace is normally one of necessity.
While it is true that an individual may choose where to work, this choice is
diminished because presently there are few workplaces which provide a
smoke-free environment. Nevertheless, Gasper has been relied upon in sub-
sequent cases to dismiss the claims of employees that exposure to co-work-
ers' tobacco smoke infringes upon their constitutional rights.5"
43. 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
44. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 720 (quoting Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532,
537 (S.D. Tex. 1972)).
45. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 721.
46. Id.
47. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX, which states: "The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
48. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 722.
49. Id. at 721.
50. See, e.g., Kensell v. Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983) (action to prohibit
smoking in plaintiff's office); Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights v. United States,
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While non-smokers' constitutional claims have yet to be accepted, advo-
cates of non-smokers' rights can draw one positive aspect from the Gasper
decision. The court in Gasper recognized that the hazard of involuntary
smoking is a social and economic ill that should be addressed, but for the
judiciary to recognize such a fundamental right would be "to engage in that
type of adjustment of individual liberties better left to the . . . legislative
processes." 51
B. Common Law Claims.
Non-smokers have asserted several common law claims alleging that the
employer has a duty to provide a work area free from unsafe conditions.
The cornerstone of this claim rests on the decision of Shimp v. New Jersey
Bell Telephone Co.52 In this case, the plaintiff, an employee, sought to enjoin
her employer from allowing cigarette smoking in the work area because she
had a severe allergic reaction to the smoke. The New Jersey Superior Court
concluded that exposure to tobacco smoke caused the plaintiff's physical
symptoms and was also harmful to non-hypersensitive persons.53 It is clear
under common law that an employee has a right to work in a safe environ-
ment.54 This right stems from a duty of the employer to provide a work area
free from unsafe conditions.55 In defining unsafe conditions due to preventa-
ble hazards, as distinguished from occupational hazards, Shimp recognized
that, "[t]here can be no doubt that the by-products of burning tobacco are
toxic and dangerous to the health of smokers and non-smokers generally and
this plaintiff in particular."56 In its decision, the Shimp court relied on ex-
tensive medical evidence, such as the finding that a significant percentage of
446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926
(1979) (action brought to prohibit smoking in federal buildings). See also GASP v Mecklen-
burg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979) (action to ban smoking in county
buildings and facilities). In any event, constitutional rights would only be at issue with respect
to public employers and private entities so closely associated with the government that their
actions would satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of state action.
51. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 719.
52. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976).
53. Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416; Ashe & Vaughan, supra note 34, at 390.
54. Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
55. Id. See also Lapham v. Pa. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 103 Pa.
Commw. 144, 519 A.2d 1101 (1987) (claimant who resigned from her position because she
suffered from allergic bronchitis due to exposure to cigarette smoke in the work area met the
burden of showing compelling cause for termination).
56. Shimp, *145 N.J. Super. at 526, 368 A.2d at 413. See also McCarthy v. Washington
Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 46 Wash. App. 125, 730 P.2d 681 (1986), aff'd, 110 Wash. 2d
812, 759 P.2d 351 (1988) (en banc), (held as long as a plaintiff can prove when her disease is
not an occupational disease, the plaintiff may sue her employer at common law for negligently
failing to provide a safe office environment).
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the United States working population has an allergy to cigarette smoke, pro-
ducing discomforting symptoms such as coughing, wheezing, eye irritations
and headaches." The court labeled these hazards as preventable and not a
natural by-product of the defendant's business.58 Further, the court stated
that such an atmosphere was not unavoidable:
Plaintiff works in an office. The tools of her trade are pens, pencils,
paper, a typewriter and a telephone. There is no necessity to fill
the air with tobacco smoke in order to carry on defendant's busi-
ness, so it cannot be regarded as an occupational hazard which
plaintiff has voluntarily assumed in pursuing a career as a
secretary. 59
The reasoning utilized by the Court in Shimp has been followed in subse-
quent decisions. For example, in Smith v. Western Electric Co.," the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff, an employee of Western
Electric, stated a claim against the employer for breach of the employer's
common law duty to provide the employee with a safe place to work.61 The
plaintiff's claim resulted from involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke in the
workplace.62 While the court recognized that the employer had a duty to
provide a safe workplace, on remand the trial court in Smith v. AT&T Tech-
nologies Inc.63 found that this duty had not been breached." The court
found that the evidence did not demonstrate that "the tobacco smoke at
plaintiff's former workplace was harmful or hazardous to his health ... or
to the health of the other employees in that area."65
In Lapham v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 66 the plaintiff,
an employee who suffered from allergic bronchitis due to exposure from cig-
arette smoke in the work area, resigned from her position because of this
condition. She sought and was denied unemployment compensation bene-
fits. 67 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated that "terminating
employment for health reasons, the [plaintiff] must show that she explained
to her employer her medical condition and her inability to perform regularly
assigned duties, and submitted medical evidence of her condition., 68 Once
57. Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 529, 368 A.2d at 415.
58. Id. at 523, 368 A.2d at 411.
59. Id.
60. 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). See also Lapham, 519 A.2d 1101.
61. 643 S.W.2d at 14.
62. 643 S.W.2d at 10.
63. No. 446121 slip op. at 3-4 (St. Louis Co. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 1985).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Lapham, 103 Pa. Commw. 144, 519 A.2d 1101.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 146, 519 A.2d at 1102.
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this burden has been met, the defendant/employer must provide a suitable
alternative.69 This burden on the employer stems from an employer's duty
to provide a work area that is free from unsafe conditions.7° In contrast to
the court's decision in AT&T Technologies, which also recognized the exist-
ence of such a duty but found no breach,7" the court in Lapham found a
breach.7 2 The distinguishing factor is the lack of medical evidence in AT&T
Technologies.73 In Lapham, evidence was introduced which established "the
toxic nature of tobacco smoke and its injurious and deleterious effects on
health, . . . not only to the smokers, but also to the nonsmokers who are
exposed to 'secondhand' smoke."74 Based on this evidence, the court held
that the defendant failed to provide a suitable alternative and granted the
plaintiff's unemployment compensation benefits.75
The tobacco industry argues that the employer has a duty to accommo-
date only the needs of "typical" employees. Similarly, in Gordon v. Raven
Systems and Research, Inc.,76 the court held that "The common law does
not impose upon an employer the duty or burden to conform his workplace
to the particular needs or sensitivities of an individual employee. Without
such a duty, appellant can complain of no wrong."77
As the Lapham decision illustrates, medical evidence has changed the di-
rection of court decisions since the Gordon court rendered its decision.
First, the Surgeon General's Report of 1986 states that involuntary smoking
affects even the "typical" employee in the workplace.7" Second, the percent-
age of employees who are "hypersensitive" to involuntary smoking is too
significant to be ignored.79
The court in Shimp also drew an interesting analogy that is even more
convincing today in view of the increased amount of medical evidence:
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See AT&T Technologies, No. 446121, slip. op. (St. Louis Co. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 1988).
72. Lapham, 103 Pa. Commw. at 146, 519 A.2d at 1102.
73. See AT&T Technologies, No. 446121, slip op. (St. Louis Co. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 1988).
74. Lapham, 103 Pa. Commw. at 147, 519 A.2d at 1102.
75. Id. at 148, 519 A.2d at 1103.
76. 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. App. 1983). See also Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. C-
3617-81E (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., Aug. 18, 1983) (the safety or adequacy of the work envi-
ronment is to be judged by reference to the typical employee, rather than one who is hypersen-
sitive). See also Smith v. AT&T Technologies Inc., No. 446121 St. Louis Cty. Cir. Ct., April
23, 1985), slip op. at 3-4 (the Court ruled that it does not have to have the authority to require
the defendant to provide a comfortable workplace for its employee, only a reasonably safe
workplace.).
77. Gordon, 462 A.2d at 15.
78. Carlson, supra note 32, at 7.
79. Id.
A Call For Action: The Burning Issue
The company already [has] in effect a rule-that cigarettes may not
be smoked around the telephone equipment. The rationale behind
the rule [is] that the machines are extremely sensitive and [can] be
damaged by the smoke. Human beings [in general] are also very
sensitive and can be damaged by cigarette smoke. Unlike a piece of
machinery, the damage to a human is all too often irreparable. If a
circuit or wiring goes bad, the company can install a replacement
part. It is not so simple in the case of a human lung, eye or heart
A company which has demonstrated such concern for its
mechanical components should have at least as much concern for
its human beings.80
In summary, under the common law, the employer has a duty to provide a
reasonably safe workplace for the typical employee. Moreover, it has be-
come increasingly clear that the hazards of smoking in the workplace affect
all employees. Consequently, a duty to impose smoking restrictions would
benefit all employees and, therefore, is justified.
C. Statutory Claims.
In general, legislative action addressing the workplace environment has
not been successful in obtaining judicially enforced smoking restrictions in
the private workplace.8" Judicial remedies have been limited to occupational
safety and handicapped discrimination claims, 2 providing negligible relief
for the typical non-smoker.8 3 For instance, in Federal Employees for Non-
Smokers' Rights v. United States,84 "[g]roups opposed to smoking and non-
smokers employed by federal agencies brought an action seeking ... injunc-
tive relief restricting smoking in federal buildings to designated areas."8 5
The court stated that while the Occupation Safety and Health Act (OSH
Act)8 6 "does require federal agencies to provide safe and healthful places
and conditions of employment," the OSH Act "does not provide employees
with a private cause of action against federal employers."87
The leading case concerning handicapped discrimination claims is Vickers
80. Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 516, 368 A.2d at 408.
81. Ashe & Vaughan, supra note 34, at 386.
82. Id.
83. Comment, Limited Relief For Federal Employees Hypersensitive To Tobacco Smoke:
Federal Employer's Who'd Rather Fight May Have To Switch, 59 WASH. L. REV. 303 (1984)
[hereinafter Limited Relief For Federal Employees].
84. 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 926 (1979).
85. 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1970).
87. FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 183.
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v. Veterans Administration." In Vickers, the plaintiff was a non-smoker.
Due to his hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke, the plaintiff was considered a
"handicapped person" under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.89 However, in
order to be entitled to recovery, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate that the
defendant/employer discriminated against him by reason of his handicap. 90
Thus, the plaintiff asserted that he was discriminated against because of his
employer's failure to provide reasonable accommodations for his physical
handicap by providing a work environment free from tobacco smoke.9 The
court rejected this argument and held that the employer did more than what
was reasonable to accommodate the plaintiff for his physical handicap.92
In determining who qualifies under the statute as a handicapped person,
the courts have imposed a strict interpretation. For example, in GASP v.
Mecklenburg County,93 the court ruled that a group of non-smokers who
were "harmed in any way" by the presence of tobacco smoke did not consti-
tute "handicapped persons."94 The court reached this conclusion because it
believed, "[i]t is manifestly clear that the legislature did not intend to include
within the meaning of 'handicapped persons'.., people who are harmed or
irritated by tobacco smoke." 95
In Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection Board,96 the plaintiff established a
primafacie case for entitlement to benefits as a disabled employee due to her
88. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982). See also 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1984) ("Any person is a handicapped person if that person
has a physical impairment which substantially limits one or more of his or her major life
activities.").
90. Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 87 ("No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
U.S. as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(1) of this title shall solely by reason of his handicap
be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity conducted by any executive agency or by the U.S. postal
service.").
91. Id.
92. Id. at 88. For example, smokers and non-smokers occupied separate offices. In addi-
tion, the employer obtained a voluntary agreement from employees in adjacent rooms to re-
frain from smoking. Further, the employer attempted to obtain an improved exhaust system
for the plaintiff's work area as well as improving the ventilation system. Also, an air purifier
was purchased at the employer's expense for the plaintiff's private office. The employer also
offered to partition the plaintiff's desk from the rest of the office and the plaintiff was given the
opportunity to move his desk closer to the window. Finally, if none of these accommodations
mollified the plaintiff, he was offered an outside maintenance job by the defendant.
93. 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979).
94. Id.
95. Id. 42 N.C. App. at 257, 256 S.E. 2d at 479.
96. 690 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Alexander v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd., 104 Cal. App. 3d 97, 163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980) (holding that a nurse who left her job
because of her reactions to tobacco smoke had sufficient grounds to do so, and was eligible for
unemployment compensation).
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hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke.97 The court stated that:
[A] person is totally disabled, if unable to perform useful and effi-
cient services in the grade or class of its position last occupied by
the employee or member because of disease or injury not due to
vicious habits, intemperance, or willful misconduct or his part
within five years before becoming so disabled.98
As a result, the court imposed a duty on the defendant/employer either to
pay disability benefits or to provide the plaintiff a comparable job in a
smoke-free environment. 99
The tobacco industry cites Vickers in asserting that courts should leave it
up to employers "to fashion appropriate accommodations that take into ac-
count both the desires of smokers and non-smokers."' ° However, in
Parodi, the employer took no steps to fashion appropriate accommodations,
consequently judicial intervention was necessary to initiate these
accommodations. 10 1
The authors agree with those who stated that the decisions involving stat-
utory claims "offer only derivative relief to the non-smoker who is merely
concerned about the health hazards of involuntary smoking. Given the judi-
ciary's general reluctance to grant relief based on a possibility rather than a
probability of future harm, concerned non-smokers should seek relief in leg-
islative action.' 0 2
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE.
Although the judiciary does offer some means of reform, it has continually
expressed its inability to equitably balance the rights of non-smokers against
the rights of smokers. Consequently, the process of weighing individual lib-
erties is better entrusted to legislative processes."0 3 Despite differing objec-
tives, the advocates of both non-smokers' rights and the tobacco industry
feel that the legislature is the most efficient means to regulate smoking in the
workplace. As a recent editorial stated, "[i]f the court finds that the respon-
sibility rests solely in the hands of the legislature, then the legislature owes it
to the people to do the job."'' 4
Since 1964, there has been a decrease in the smoking population of Ameri-
97. Parodi, 690 F. 2d 731; Alexander, 104 Cal. App. 3d 97, 163 Cal. Rptr. 411.
98. Parodi, 690 F.2d at 737. See also 5 U.S.C. § 8331(6) (Repealed. Pub. L. No. 96-499,
Title IV, § 403(b); 94 stat. 2603 (1980)).
99. Parodi, 690 F.2d at 739.
100. Ashe & Vaughan, supra note 34, at 388.
101. Parodi, 690 F.2d at 739.
102. Limited Relief For Federal Employees, supra note 83.
103. Carlson, supra note 32, at 722.
104. Bilosky, 6 ANR UPDATE (Fall 1987).
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cans from 42% to approximately 30%. 10 Therefore, the majority of people
are non-smokers who would not be adversely affected by smoking restric-
tions in the workplace. These figures suggest that a majority of people
would endorse restrictions on smoking in the workplace. It is the duty of the
legislature to represent the will of the majority.
There has been a growing response by the legislators on the national, state
and local levels. To date, there has been little federal legislation directly
regulating smoking in the workplace. This was initially due to the lack of
medical evidence on the hazardous effects of involuntary smoking. More
recently, however, the primary obstacle to such legislation is due to the
strength and persistence of the tobacco industry.
As the 100th Session of Congress closed, there was one major break-
through in the area of smoking regulation. Congress passed an amendment
which bans smoking on all airline flights under two hours."6 The ban af-
fects 80% of all scheduled flights. When the bill was introduced initially in
the House in mid-1986, it was met with great skepticism. However, with the
growing awareness of the hazards of involuntary smoking, as well as airline
safety, the bill passed through Congress. 10 7 Advocates of non-smokers'
rights feel that this legislation may be the initial step needed to generate
future actions on the national level directed at the workplace.I°8 In fact, a
recent Senate report indicates that action was taken on smoking restrictions
over thirty times in the 100th Session of Congress,"0 9 including another air-
line anti-smoking act which would ban smoking on all airline flights." 0
More importantly, there has been considerable action taken concerning the
rights of non-smokers in the workplace. For instance, there is a proposed
105. Koop, supra note 3, at 110.
106. 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (Supp. IV 1986). Federal Aviation Act, § 404 49 U.S.C. § 1374
(1958) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following subsection:
(d)(1)
(A) On and after the date of expiration of the 4 month period following the date
of enactment of this subsection it shall be unlawful to smoke in the passenger cabin
or lavatory on any scheduled airline flight in intrastate, interstate, or overseas air
transportation, if such flight is scheduled for 2 hours or less in duration.
(B) The Secretary of Transportation shall issue such regulations as may be neces-
sary to carry out the provisions of this subsection.
(C) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection are repealed effective on
the expiration of the twenty-eight month period following the date of enactment of
this subsection.
107. Telephone interview with Regina Carlson, Executive Director of New Jersey Group
Against Smoking (GASP) (January 6, 1988).
108. Id.
109. Staff of Senate Comm. on Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Smoking Leg-
islation (Comm. Print 1988).
110. H.R. 432, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Airline Anti-Smoking Act (1987).
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ban on smoking in all federal buildings except for designated areas.'
While there is a greater desire to protect non-smokers' rights through fed-
eral regulation of smoking in the workplace, there has been substantial ac-
tion taken by state legislatures. Forty states and the District of Columbia
have already enacted statutes which restrict smoking in the workplace and
other public places. 112 However, to date" 3 only 14 states have enacted re-
strictions that specifically address the workplace.'1 4
A. 50-State Survey.
Because most of the legislative activity concerning the rights of non-smok-
ers has occurred at the state level, an analytical review of each state legisla-
tures' response in this area will be helpful to practitioners and laypersons
alike. The legislative action can be broken down into four levels of response:
111. H.R. 1008, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Non-Smokers Health Protection Act of
1987). See also S. Res. 154, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Resolution to prohibit smoking in
the Senate wing of the Capitol). See also S. Res. 154, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Prohibition
of Smoking in Public in Public Conveyances Act of 1987).
112. ALASKA STAT. § 18.35.310 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36 601.01 (1974); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-3701-03 (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25940-25947 (Deering
1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-103 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-21b (1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 1326 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-913 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 386.204
(West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-2 (1984); HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-201 (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 39-5503 (1985); IND. CODE § 13-1-13-1 (1987); IOWA CODE § 98A.1 (1984); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4009 (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1261 (1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
22, § 1578 (1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 24-205 (1987); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 270
§ 21 (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § § 333.12601-333.12687 (Callahan 1987); MINN.
STAT. § 144.391 (1987); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 50.40.101 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5707
(1981); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.249 (Michie 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155.45
(1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-16-1 (1985); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 1399(o) (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-09 (1987); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3791.03.1 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. 21, § 1247 (1975); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 433.845 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1623 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7 (1986);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-36-2 (1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.01 (Vernon
1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-106 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. 18, § 1421 (1987); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.010 (1985); W.VA. CODE § 21-3-8 (1923); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 101.123.1 (West 1985).
113. This comment was submitted to the publisher on February 1, 1989. Any legislative
action taken subsequently would have been too late to include in this article. The interested
reader should examine his/her state statutes as many legislatures are taking constant action
concerning smoking in the workplace.
114. ALASKA STAT. § 18.35.310 (1984); COLO. REV. STAT. CODE § 25-14-101-103 (1982);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 386.203(3) (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 22, § 1580-A (1987);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.411 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50.40.103 (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 71-5704 (West 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155.30.53 (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:30-23-31 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-16-7 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
20.7 (1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-106(3) and 76-101-10.3 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 1421-428 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.060 (1987).
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(1) no legislative action; (2) minor legislative action; (3) action regulating
only public places; and (4) action regulating public and private places, in-
cluding the workplace.
1. No Legislative Action.
At the time of publication, ten states have yet to enact any legislation
prohibiting smoking. These states include Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia
and Wyoming. The major reason for legislative inaction can be attributed to
the influential lobbying efforts of the tobacco industry. The majority of these
states rely heavily on their tobacco crops and many of the larger tobacco
companies are located in these states.'"5 It is obvious that the legislatures of
these states do not want to upset the tobacco growers and producers by plac-
ing smoking prohibitions in public areas or the private workplace.
It will require an enormous public outcry by the citizenry of these states to
compel their lawmakers to turn their backs on the powerful tobacco indus-
try. This is unlikely to occur in the near future for these "tobacco" states
because it appears that the tobacco industry has a strong hold on the
legislatures.
2. Minor Legislative Action.
A number of states have taken some legislative action to prohibit smoking,
but not necessarily in response to the concerns of non-smokers. For exam-
ple, in Delaware smoking is prohibited "on any trackless trolley coach, or
gasoline or diesel-engine propelled bus being used as a public convey-
ance." 16 It is likely that this legislation was formulated in response to fire
safety concerns rather than the dangers of second-hand smoke, as there is no
other legislation prohibiting cigarette smoking in Delaware. In Louisiana,
the only place where smoking is prohibited is in the Louisiana Superdome.
The statute permits smoking "in all areas of the Louisiana Superdome ex-
cept the arena."' 7 Passed in 1986, it is probable that this legislation is a
delayed response to the holding in Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposi-
tion District,118 where the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana refused to enjoin smoking in the arena.
Two states, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, have also enacted very nar-
row anti-smoking legislation. In Pennsylvania, smoking is prohibited in re-
115. For example, R. J. Reynolds, producer of Winston-Salem tobacco products, is located
in North Carolina.
116. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1326 (1979).
117. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1261 (West 1986).
118. 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976).
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tail stores,"19 presumably to protect the merchandise. However, the statute
does provide that "private offices or work areas not generally open to the
public may be designated 'no smoking,' 'smoking permitted,' or sectioned
into different areas at the discretion of the employer."' 2 ° This language indi-
cates the Pennsylvania state legislature's reluctance to interfere with the pri-
vate employer's prerogative to structure his own business operations. West
Virginia law, on the other hand, simply makes it a misdemeanor to smoke in
"any factory, mercantile establishment, mill or workshop in which is posted
[a sign] ... stating that no smoking is allowed in such a building."' 21 Once
again, this statute was not passed to protect the rights of non-smokers, but
was passed for fire safety reasons and protection of employers' merchandise.
Finally,- Arkansas and Hawaii have taken slightly larger steps to prohibit
smoking in certain public places, such as elevators, auditoriums, sports are-
nas, community centers 122 and health care centers. 123 However, neither
state legislature expressly recognizes the dangers of second-hand smoke.
Thus, the scope of smoking restrictions is limited.
3. Smoking Prohibitions in Public Places.
A number of states have prohibited smoking in indoor public places rang-
ing from public transportation to all state-owned buildings. Some of these
states have recognized the growing danger of second-hand smoke, but have
refused to extend the prohibition into the private workplace, leaving it to the
individual employers to set their own smoking policy. For instance,
Arizona,'2 4 Georgia,12 5 Maryland,126 New York, 127 Oklahoma,128 South
Dakota 129 and Texas 130 have taken the same approach as Arkansas and Ha-
waii, but the scope of the regulations are broader. In general, these six states
prohibit smoking in elevators, public transportation, theaters, public health
facilities, libraries, museums, public schools and jury rooms. Of these states,
only Arizona and Oklahoma have stated that smoking in any of the above-
mentioned public places "is a public nuisance and dangerous to public
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1623 (1985).
120. Id.
121. W. VA. CODE § 21-3-8 (1923).
122. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3702 (Supp. 1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-201 (1985).
123. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3702 (Supp. 1985).
124. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01 (1986).
125. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-2 (1984).
126. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 24-205 (1987); MD. TRANSP. § 7-705 (Supp. 1986).
127. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399(o) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
128. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1247 (1983).
129. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-36-2 (1988).
130. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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health." 
3 1
Another group of states extend the scope of smoking restrictions to any
state-owned building. Those states include Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nevada, Ohio and the District of Columbia. 132 Most of these
states include all the previous restrictions but go further by prohibiting
smoking in any "public building owned by or under control of [the] state or
any of its political subdivisions,"' 133 except for those areas which are desig-
nated as "smoking permitted." It should be noted that almost all state laws
provide that the proprietor or owner of any public building who is required
to prohibit smoking may designate smoking areas as long as it does not vio-
late any other statutory provision. 13' For example, an owner of a theater
may permit smoking in a portion of the lobby, but may not permit smoking
in any elevators.
Finally, a group of states have gone further to prohibit smoking in all
indoor public places, including restaurants of certain sizes. 135 The signifi-
cance of extending the smoking restrictions to restaurants indicates the legis-
latures' willingness to interfere with what is essentially a private enterprise in
order to protect the health of a non-smoker. However, as noted above, these
restrictions do not include all restaurants nor do they include the entirety of
any particular restaurant. For example, in Connecticut, the law states that,
"no person shall smoke .. . in any public area of a restaurant having a
seating capacity of seventy-five or more persons unless a sign is posted which
indicates that smoking is permitted in such an area, provided no such restau-
rant shall be designated, in its entirety, as a smoking area."' 136 While this
last group of state legislatures displays some willingness to interfere with
private enterprise (though these private buildings are open to the general
131. Supra note 124; supra note 128.
132. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-911 (Supp.1988); IND. CODE § 13-1-13-1 (Bums 1987); IOWA
CODE § 98A.1 (Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 220, § 21 (Supp. 1988); MICH
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.12601 (West 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.249 (1987); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3791.03.1 (Page 1988).
133. See IOWA CODE § 98a.2(6) (1984).
134. See, e.g., N.Y. Pun HEALTH LAW § 1399(o) (McKinney Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 333.12605(1) (West 1984).
135. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25940-25949 (Deering 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-21b (Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 39-5501-39-5510 (Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4008 (Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-09 to -11 (Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ § 433.835 to 433.875 (1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 101.123 (West 1988).
136. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21b(b) (1987). See also, OR. REV. STAT. § 433.850(3)
(1987), which states: "notwithstanding any other provisions of ORS 433-835 to 433.875 and
433.990(5) in the case of restaurants... nothing... is intended to prevent the owner or person
in charge from expanding or contracting the size of the smoking area to meet the requirements
of the patrons." For strict statutory language which restricts smoking to the same degree, see
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25940-25949 (Deering 1988).
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public), these legislatures are reluctant to take steps to regulate smoking in
the workplace.
4. Smoking Prohibitions in the Workplace.
As stated previously, there are fourteen states which regulate smoking in
the workplace to some degree. 137 This group of legislatures has enacted
stricter regulations in accordance with their expressed public policy con-
cerns with the dangers of second-hand smoke. 13' For instance, the Minne-
sota legislature found that "smoking causes premature death, disability and
chronic disease" and that the purpose of this legislation is "to protect the
public health, comfort and environment by prohibiting smoking in areas
where children or ill or injured persons are present, and by limiting smoking
in public places and at public meetings to designated smoking areas."' 139
Other legislatures espouse that the hazards of second-hand smoke, based on
medical evidence, are clear, therefore justifying stricter restrictions, includ-
ing restrictions in the workplace."4
Two states, Minnesota and Utah, address smoking in the workplace by
indicating that the state health agency has the power to enforce the smoking
restrictions in the workplace, as applied to public places, if the state health
agency determines "that the proximity of employees or the inadequacy of
ventilation causes smoke pollution detrimental to the health and comfort of
non-smoking employees."'' Without the state health agency taking these
affirmative steps, the private workplace would not be regulated. Further-
more, it appears that this type of regulation is done on an ad hoc basis; i.e., a
particular workplace is inspected by the state health agency at any particular
time, as compared to scheduled inspections.
In the State of Washington, there is express language indicating that the
smoking regulation statute "is not intended to regulate smoking in the pri-
vate, enclosed workplace.., except places in which smoking is prohibited by
the director of community development, through the director of fire protec-
tion, or by other law, ordinance, or regulation."' 42 Similar to Minnesota
and Utah, the State of Washington starts with the premise that smoking will
not be regulated in the private workplace. This position is subject to change,
but only at the initiative of some state or local agency.
137. Supra note 114.
138. Supra note 114; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-23 (West 1987) (the legislature's intent
is to balance the rights of smokers and non-smokers).
139. MINN. STAT. § 144.412 (West 1987).
140. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155.50 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7 (1986).
141. MINN. STAT. § 144.414 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-106(3) (1986).
142. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.060 (1985).
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There are two states, Alaska and Colorado, which simply suggest and en-
courage that private employers take the initiative to set some policy concern-
ing smoking in the workplace. 143 For instance, in Colorado, employers "are
encouraged to designate non-smoking areas that are physically separated
from the working environment where other employees smoke. Every effort
shall be made to provide a separate area for non-smokers in employee
lounges and cafeterias."'" Obviously, these state legislatures are reluctant
to interfere with a private employer's management prerogative.
The remaining nine states which regulate smoking in the workplace re-
quire the private employer to implement some smoking policy taking in the
concerns of non-smokers and smokers. These states include Florida, Maine,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Is-
land and Vermont.145
The general clause requiring such a policy usually reads as follows:
In a workplace where there are smokers and nonsmokers, employ-
ers shall develop, implement, and post a policy regarding designa-
tion of smoking and nonsmoking areas. Such a policy shall take
,into consideration the proportion of smokers and nonsmokers.
Employers who make reasonable efforts to develop, implement,
and post such a policy shall be deemed in compliance. An entire
area may be designated as a smoking area if all workers routinely
assigned to work in that area at the same time agree.' 46
This type of language requires the employer to take some initiative to pro-
tect the rights of non-smokers and smokers, but leaves the employer the flex-
ibility to set his own policy according to his particular business needs. In
Maine, the statute requires "that each employer shall establish, or may nego-
tiate through the collective bargaining process, a written policy,"' 47 indicat-
ing that smoking in the workplace is a mandatory, or at least permissive,
subject of bargaining.
Finally, in New Jersey, New Mexico and Rhode Island, the state legisla-
tures have gone further to set guidelines as to what these smoking policies
must contain. For instance, in New Mexico, the statute provides for an ab-
143. ALASKA STAT. § 18.35.300(10) (1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-103(3) (1982).
144. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-103(4) (1982).
145. FLA. STAT. § 386.205(3) (1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1580-a (1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50.40.101 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5704 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT.
§ 155.52 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:3D (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-16-7 (1985);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23.20.7 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1422 (1987).
146. FLA. STAT. § 386.205(3) (1986). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 50.40.101 (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5709 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. § 155.52 (1987).
147. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1580-A (1987); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1421 (1987).
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solute prohibition in nurses' aid stations, elevators and a contiguous non-
smoking area of not less than one-half of the office's seating capacity.' 48 In
Rhode Island, the statute permits any non-smoking employee to object to
the employer about his/her discomfort in the workplace, requiring the em-
ployer to take reasonable efforts to accommodate such an employee. How-
ever, the statute makes it clear that an employer is not required to make any
expenditures or structural changes to accommodate the preferences of non-
smoking or smoking employees. 149
The legislative response on the state level to the dangers of involuntary
smoke has been strong. As more medical evidence surfaces, legislatures will
be more willing to interfere with management's prerogative and require that
some action be taken to protect the non-smoker in the workplace, such as is
the case in New Mexico or in Rhode Island; many other states appear ready
to follow. Yet the tobacco industry's lobbying efforts stand as a major obsta-
cle to the legislative efforts.' 50
The tobacco industry has centralized its efforts to prevent such legislation
by focusing on four major areas. First, the tobacco industry argues that
these statutes are unconstitutionally vague because they fail to establish a
clear standard of required conduct.'' In support of this contention, the
tobacco industry has asserted that, "[i]mpermissibly vague laws that contain
criminal or quasi-criminal penalties are unenforceable where the standard of
conduct required is such 'that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess as to [their] meaning and differ as to [their] application'."' 52 Second,
the tobacco industry maintains that these statutes present an unlawful dele-
gation of legislative authority to private persons and an unreasonable exer-
cise of the states' police power lacking any rational basis.'53 Third, the
tobacco industry contends that statutes which may require rearrangement
and possible relocation of smoking and non-smoking employees may disrupt
employers' operations and employees may become less efficient.' 54 Finally,
the tobacco industry argues that compliance with these statutes may even
require the physical restructuring of the work area with employers incurring
148. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-16-7 (1985).
149. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7-5 (1986).
150. Bilosky, supra note 104, at 3-5.
151. Ashe & Vaughan, supra note 34, at 400.
152. Id. See also Connolly v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
153. Covington and Burling, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT LEGAL CLIMATE CON-
CERNING SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE, at 4 (1987). See, e.g., State of Florida v. Burton,
No. 80-999-A-42 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1981) (ordinance restricting smoking in public places held to be
unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to pri-
vate persons, and an unreasonable exercise of the police power).
154. Ashe & Vaughan, supra note 34, at 399.
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substantial costs. 155
While these are not all legal arguments, they are factors which have dis-
couraged legislators from supporting such legislation. Nevertheless, the pre-
ponderance of evidence, both medical and legal, and the majority of
constituents demand legislation to protect the rights of non-smokers.
IV. PROPOSED MODELS OF ACTION.
While there is a need to protect the rights of non-smokers, it would be
unnecessary to call for an absolute ban of smoking in the workplace. There
are many alternative models of action for the legislatures to pursue. Some of
these models leave complete discretion to the employers to choose, imple-
ment and enforce these restrictions. For example, a statute enacted by the
state of Colorado "encourage[s]" those in charge to designate non-smoking
areas that are physically separated from the workplace. 156 Such models are
generally ineffective because there is no way of insuring that the restrictions
will be enforced. Rather, the most comprehensive policy would be one
which acknowledges non-smoking as the norm. 157 For example, Wiscon-
sin's "Clean Indoor Act" prohibits smoking in all offices.' 58 "Office[s]" are
defined as "any area that serves as a place of work at which the principal
activities consist of professional, clerical, or administrative services." How-
ever, it also allows for designation of smoking areas or even entire rooms and
buildings. 159 In Wisconsin, non-smoking is the established norm, however
they acknowledge the need to balance the interests of all working citizens.
The ability to designate smoking areas can be used in various ways. A
model statute would prohibit smoking in any area:
in which a fire or safety hazard exists, company-owned vehicles, all
common areas - including elevators, stairwells, lobbies, waiting
rooms, copier rooms, mail rooms, employee lounges and
restrooms, computer and manufacturing areas, areas in which
smokers and non-smokers work together, classrooms and confer-
ence rooms (a short smoking break may be provided during meet-
ings lasting longer than one hour, if requested by smokers), and
any other area not specifically designated 'Smoking Prohibited.' 160
This model is appropriate because it balances both the needs of smokers
155. Id.
156. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-103(4) (1982).
157. CALIFORNIA NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUNDATION, A SMOKEFREE WORKPLACE 9
(1985) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUNDATION].
158. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 101.123.1 (West 1988).
159. Id. at § 101.123.4.
160. Id. at § 101.123.
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and non-smokers. Smoking is prohibited throughout company premises;
however, employees may request certain areas to be designated "smoking
permitted."' 61 If this type of policy is mandated by the legislature, employer
discretion will no longer hinder its effectiveness. The Rhode Island Work-
place Smoking Pollution Control Act 162 mandates that every employer
maintain a written smoking policy, "which must be conspicuously broad-
casted to all employees." 163 Further, if an employer fails to comply with
these requirements, he is subject to a civil penalty. 1 4 Penalties for violation
by any party could include injunctions, fines and possibly criminal sanctions
for persistent violators. 16
5
The tobacco industry criticizes this model statute because it fails to pro-
vide for effective enforcement mechanisms. Specifically, the tobacco indus-
try professes that, "[w]here statutes call for state and local law enforcement,
it seems plainly unrealistic to assume that significant enforcement resources
can or will be committed to monitor and punish violators of workplace
smoking laws . . .66 This argument, however, ignores. the reality that
smoking has been labeled by the Surgeon General as "Public Health Enemy
1", 167 and as such, the mere enactment of non-smoking restrictions exempli-
fies a commitment to monitor and punish violators. In addition, the tobacco
industry's argument ignores the will of the majority, which favors the enact-
ment and enforcement of these laws. 168 Enforcement lies not only with state
and local authorities, but also with employers and employees - the majority
of whom are non-smokers. Further, as medical evidence of the dangers of
involuntary smoking continues to surface, it is likely that people will be en-
couraged to follow and enforce these restrictions, for their own safety and
for the safety of those around them.
V. CONCLUSION.
Medical evidence has established that the hazards of involuntary smoking
are real. The courts have acknowledged that involuntary smoking is a social
and environmental ill, however, the courts have asserted that they cannot
and will not grant relief to the typical employee disturbed by involuntary
smoke (though the hypersensitive non-smoker may have some recourse). In
161. CALIFORNIA NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUNDATION, supra note 157, at 9.
162. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7 (Supp. 1987).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 23-20.7-7.
165. Id.
166. Colosi, National 'No Smoking' at a Glance, LAB. REL. MGMT. REV., Sept. 1987, at 2-
5.
167. Ashe & Vaughan, supra note 34, at 398.
168. CALIFORNIA NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUNDATION, supra note 157, at 9.
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fact, the courts have recognized that to engage in such an adjustment of
individual liberties is a function better left to the legislature. While the state
legislatures have acted to some extent, there is a need and a duty on their
part to intervene to a greater degree. This need stems from the increasing
medical evidence that involuntary smoking is hazardous to everyone. The
duty to respond to the will of the majority is innate within the legislative
process, and the will of the majority demands regulation of smoking in the
workplace.
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